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WISDOM AS CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDING:  
A CHRISTIAN PLATONIST PERSPECTIVE
C. Stephen Evans
This article argues that Platonism provides a plausible account of wisdom, one 
that is especially attractive for Christians. Christian Platonism sees wisdom as 
conceptual understanding; it is a “knowledge of the Forms.” To be convinc-
ing this view requires us to see understanding as including an appreciation 
of the relations between concepts as well as the value of the possible ways of 
being that concepts disclose. If the Forms are Divine Ideas, then we can see 
why God is both supremely wise and the source of all human wisdom. The 
account of wisdom provided helps explain the relation between wisdom and 
knowledge, the connection between wisdom and emotion, and much about 
how wisdom is acquired. The view also helps explain why someone who 
lacks extensive propositional knowledge can still be wise, and it helps us see 
why an understanding of the Biblical narrative and participation in the life of 
the Church can be important aids in the development of wisdom.
Although every introduction to philosophy text informs us that the word 
“philosophy” derives from Greek words meaning the love of wisdom, 
contemporary philosophy has had surprisingly little to say about wisdom, 
in proportion to the quantity of writing about such topics as knowledge, 
justification, and moral obligation, not to mention the usual things dis-
cussed in contemporary metaphysics. And I suspect that an individual 
who perused the contemporary philosophical journals or attended a con-
temporary meeting of one of the divisions of the American Philosophical 
Association might well wonder if contemporary philosophy is actually a 
quest for wisdom inspired by love. Not only is there usually very little ex-
plicit discussion of wisdom; the observer of the contemporary philosophi-
cal scene might well wonder whether the things that are discussed even 
have much relevance to wisdom, and whether the discussions that take 
place help either the philosophers doing the discussing or anyone else to 
make progress towards becoming wiser. Are contemporary philosophers, 
as a group, wiser than other people? I am not sure that we are; some of us 
are surely smarter and cleverer than most folks, and undoubtedly many 
of us are learned and knowledgeable about many things. But it is not clear 
that the kind of knowledge most of us possess makes us wise.
What is the relation between knowledge and wisdom? Well, of course, it 
might make a difference what conception of knowledge we are operating 
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with. Contemporary epistemology, by and large, operates with a concep-
tion of knowledge in which the object of knowledge consists of proposi-
tions. Knowledge is justified true belief, or reliably produced true belief, 
or true beliefs that are the achievements of an excellent cognitive agent, or 
something like one of these things plus some further condition that must 
be added to rule out Gettier cases. In virtually all of these cases, the things 
that count as knowledge are beliefs, and the contents of the beliefs are 
propositions. There is, however, an older conception of knowledge, found 
in the Greeks and present throughout the middle ages, surviving at least 
until such early modern philosophers as Locke, in which knowledge is 
a kind of seeing, a direct vision of something. (The ancient and medieval 
philosophers tended to see this “seeing” as a direct encounter with real-
ity itself, while the moderns typically saw the object of knowledge as an 
“idea” or mental representation of reality.) It is arguable, I think, that this 
conception of knowledge as awareness continues in our ordinary concept 
of knowledge even today, though it is not prominent in philosophical theo-
ries of knowledge.
I will return to this older conception of knowledge as a kind of direct 
seeing in due course, but I want first to work with the familiar contempo-
rary philosophical concept of knowledge as propositional knowledge. In 
this propositional sense of knowledge, I take it as a datum that knowledge 
and wisdom are not the same thing, even though they may be connected. 
We all know people who know lots of facts but who are not very wise. 
Some of us have been privileged to know uneducated people, people who 
do not know very many things, who are nonetheless very wise. So what-
ever else wisdom might be, it is not simply knowing a great many propo-
sitional facts.
I suspect that the aridity of some recent philosophical work on wisdom 
is due to the assumption that wisdom must be understood in terms of 
propositional knowledge. If one looks, for example, at Sharon Ryan’s Stan-
ford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on wisdom, Ryan considers four pos-
sible views of wisdom: (1) wisdom as epistemic humility, knowing what 
one does not know; (2) wisdom as epistemic accuracy—knowing what 
one knows and what one does not know; (3) wisdom as knowledge—ei-
ther extensive empirical knowledge or “knowing how to live well”; and 
(4) wisdom as knowledge and action—knowing how to live well and ac-
tually doing so.1 Ryan concludes that there is some truth in all four views 
and puts forward the claim that a person is wise if and only if the person 
has extensive factual and theoretical knowledge, knows how to live well, 
has succeeded in living well, and has few unjustified beliefs. This seems 
more a hodge-podge of conditions than a well-thought-out understand-
ing of wisdom. I suspect the problem is that the conception of knowledge 
Ryan is operating with for at least three of these four conditions seems to 
be propositional knowledge.
1http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wisdom/ (2007). 
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Besides being a bit of a hodge-podge, Ryan’s view just does not work. 
It is not clear that all of these elements are necessary for wisdom: Would 
someone really argue that Gandhi or Gautama (the Buddha) were not 
wise people because they lacked “extensive factual and theoretical knowl-
edge?” And suppose it is true that St. Francis of Assisi had a good number 
of unjustified beliefs. Would that disqualify him from being wise?
I don’t mean to suggest that there is no connection between wisdom 
and propositional knowledge. One characteristic I would expect to find 
in a wise person is an understanding of the value of propositional knowl-
edge. As some of the views that Ryan discusses imply, perhaps the wise 
person does not value all kinds of knowledge equally, but recognizes that 
some kinds of knowledge possess a special value: the wise person knows 
what it means to live well and perhaps how to do so. However, perhaps 
in addition to paying attention to what the wise person knows, we need 
to take account of how the wise person knows what he or she knows. In 
talking about the “how” of knowledge I don’t mean to speak primarily 
about the way the person gained this knowledge, but rather about what 
we might call the mode of understanding that the knowledge includes.
Let me try to unpack this somewhat cryptic remark by looking at the 
structure of propositional knowledge. To really know some true proposi-
tion of the form “S is p,” the knower must have an understanding of the 
relevant concepts “S” and “p.” To know that snow is white, I must have an 
understanding of what it is to be snow and what it is to be white. To turn 
to a more interesting example, if it were true that “property is a form of 
theft,” as Proudhon asserted (though I assume this is in fact false), to know 
this is true one would have to have an understanding of the concepts of 
both property and theft. We might use the term “knowledge” to describe 
this understanding, and say that the individual in this case knows what 
property is and knows what theft is, but if so, I think we are using it more 
in the ancient sense of knowledge as a kind of seeing, rather than in the 
modern propositional sense. And we might think that the knowledge that 
this understanding embodies must involve a reference to truth, since we 
would undoubtedly say that the person must have a true understanding 
of property and theft in order to know this proposition. But this again does 
not seem to be the contemporary sense of truth, in which truth involves a 
correspondence relation between a proposition and reality, since the “cor-
respondence” in this case, if that is the right term, seems to be between 
concept and reality. Though I am far from a Heidegger scholar, perhaps it 
is something like this sense of truth that Heidegger is getting at in Being 
and Time, where he argues that there is a more primordial kind of truth 
than correspondence truth, the truth of “uncoveredness” or “disclosed-
ness” or “revelation.”2 For when we do have a grasp of some concept, it is 
as if that concept in some way discloses or uncovers some aspect of reality 
2Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1962), 256–273.
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for us. And that is not surprising, since a concept is simply a possible way 
of being.
It is, I think, a striking feature of this kind of conceptual understanding 
that it comes in degrees. Two individuals can both know some proposi-
tion to be true, but one can know it in a deeper way because that indi-
vidual has a deeper understanding of the relevant concepts. It is for this 
reason that Kierkegaard is fond of saying, somewhat paradoxically, that 
“to understand and to understand are two different things.”3 He means 
that one can know a truth but have a very superficial understanding 
of what one knows. Such a person might be able to answer a true-false 
question about the proposition in question, and perhaps even translate 
the proposition into a foreign language. So in one sense the person un-
derstands the relevant concepts and therefore the proposition, but the 
understanding can be a kind of purely verbal understanding, divorced 
from any connection to reality. In Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 
Kierkegaard (I am going to ignore issues of pseudonymity in this paper) 
gives several examples of the kinds of things that can be known in a deep 
way or a superficial way, depending on the kind of understanding that is 
an ingredient in the knowledge.4
We all know, says Kierkegaard (speaking to his nineteenth-century Dan-
ish contemporaries), that “I should thank God for the good he gives me.”5 
That gratitude towards God is good is something that everyone knows, or 
at least something that every Christian is supposed to know. Nevertheless, 
not everyone, not even every Christian, has a deep understanding of what 
it means to be grateful to God. Does it mean that I should thank God only 
for the things that I see as good? Ought I to be thankful for things that do 
not appear to be good, at least to most people, things such as trials and 
sufferings? What, exactly, does it mean for me to be grateful and to live 
with gratitude? What is the nature of the God to whom I should be grate-
ful and how do I properly express my gratitude? Without answers to such 
questions as these, my “knowledge” of the truth of the proposition may 
be quite superficial.
Furthermore, to have a really profound grasp of what it means to be 
grateful to God, I need to be able to answer these questions in relation to 
the concrete circumstances of my own life, so that I know what gratitude 
means for me, in my situation. What is needed for a deeper and more pro-
found knowledge is not more propositional knowledge, but a deeper un-
derstanding of the relevant concepts, including a sense of how the concept 
bears on the individual’s own life. And it does seem that the individual 
who has this deeper kind of knowledge is thereby at least a little wiser.
3Søren Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. 
Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 90.
4Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, Vol. I, 
ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 
165–188.
5Concluding Unscientific Postscript, pp. 178–179.
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Let me therefore say, as a first stab at understanding wisdom, that wis-
dom is simply conceptual understanding, or knowledge of concepts, in 
the sense of knowledge in which knowledge is not necessarily proposi-
tional. The wise person is not simply the person who knows a lot of facts, 
but who has a deep understanding of the concepts we employ in stating 
those facts. We might say, following Plato, that wisdom is a knowledge of 
the Forms. Here I am not ashamed to associate myself with the long and 
distinguished tradition of Christian Platonism, a tradition that goes back 
at least to Augustine and includes such distinguished contemporary phi-
losophers as Robert Adams.
Since concepts, on this view, disclose reality to us, the person who has 
knowledge of the Forms does not merely know concepts. The person who 
has this kind of understanding can recognize those concrete realities that 
fall under a concept. To put it paradoxically, conceptual understanding is 
not purely “conceptual,” but includes an ability to recognize things as 
what they are. This is not a genuine paradox; someone who understands a 
concept has the ability to recognize things as they are, because a concept is 
a possible way of being. The wise person understands in a deep way what 
it is to be good, what justice is, what courage is, and thus can recognize 
instances of goodness and justice.
On this Christian Platonist proposal, the wise person understands 
Goodness, Beauty, Justice, and whatever other Forms there may be. And 
here a knowledge of the Forms is not merely a knowledge of what is the 
case, but of what might possibly be the case as well as what must necessar-
ily be the case. To understand the essence of beauty is to know the different 
ways beauty might possibly be encountered, rather than simply to know 
what things are beautiful, and of course it involves an understanding of 
relations that hold between the Forms. The person who understands the 
beautiful deeply must also understand the ugly, and have some grasp of 
the relations that hold between the beautiful and the good and the true.
To this modal knowledge of what is possibly and necessarily true, we 
might plausibly add that the kind of understanding that constitutes wis-
dom also includes knowing what would probably be the case in some spe-
cific situation when some quality is present. Thus, a wise person not only 
knows what forms courage can possibly take and what courage must nec-
essarily include, but also knows, assuming that the requisite knowledge of 
human nature is also present, that a human person who is courageous is 
not likely to turn and run in the face of some particular threat.
Recently Jonathan Kvanvig has written, in his book The Value of Knowl-
edge and the Pursuit of Understanding, about understanding, which he also 
distinguishes from knowledge in the ordinary sense.6 Kvanvig writes that 
6Jonathan L. Kvanvig, The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003). The attention given by Kvanvig and others recently to 
the role of understanding in epistemology is an important development that, if this paper is 
right, pushes contemporary epistemology in a direction that brings questions about wisdom 
to the foreground.
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“understanding requires, and knowledge does not, an internal grasping 
or appreciation of how the various elements in a body of information are 
related to each other.”7 I think that conceptual understanding in my sense 
is certainly related to what Kvanvig has in mind by “understanding,” for 
understanding a concept is partly a matter of seeing the relations between 
that concept and others, and the person who sees those relations will be 
able rightly to see the relations between the elements in a body of infor-
mation. Kvanvig distinguishes understanding that is propositional in 
character (“understanding that p”) and conceptual understanding that is 
“objectual” in character. The latter kind of understanding he describes as 
“quasi-factive” in nature, since it may be directed to “chunks” of informa-
tion, but it is not clear that such understanding must be propositional in 
character. The key idea is that understanding requires a recognition of the 
connections and relations between the objects in the region of understand-
ing. If it is not identical to conceptual understanding in my sense, this kind 
of understanding is at least a central part of conceptual understanding.
Conceptual understanding in my sense, while an ingredient in proposi-
tional understanding, seems to me to be something more elemental, since 
its focus is on concepts, conceived as instruments whereby reality is un-
covered or revealed to us. One might think that conceptual understanding 
is essentially propositional after all; it is just that to understand a concept 
is not only to know what is in fact true, when some predicate actually 
applies to some substance, for example, but what could possibly be true 
and what is necessarily true concerning that predicate (and perhaps what 
is probably true). However, I am inclined to think that this gets things 
upside down. We don’t understand a concept because we know the truth 
values of its modal instances, but we know the truth value of the modal 
instances because we have an understanding of the concept.8
This initial suggestion that wisdom is linked to conceptual understand-
ing may look somewhat unpromising, since it does not appear to capture 
the practical dimension of wisdom. Surely, Robert Nozick is right, when, 
in his book The Examined Life, he maintains that “wisdom is practical; it 
helps. Wisdom is what you need to understand in order to live well and cope with 
the central problems and avoid the dangers in the predicament(s) human beings 
7Kvanvig, The Value of Knowledge, pp. 192–193.
8One might think, as one reviewer of the article suggested might possibly be the case, 
that in the end conceptual understanding reduces to propositional knowledge after all, if 
one includes in this body of knowledge such propositions as “knowing that form C is more 
important than D and less important than E,” “knowing what is the appropriate emotional 
response to instances of C,” “knowing what is possible for C-ness,” and so on. However, I 
think this suggestion faces several problems. One is a “which comes first, chicken or egg” 
problem. It is true that at least much of what we call conceptual understanding can be ex-
pressed propositionally. However, it seems equally true that propositional knowledge it-
self seems to presuppose conceptual understanding, for the Heideggerian reason discussed 
above. A second problem is I think more serious: The grasping of possibilities or seeing that 
includes understanding and appreciating the value of possible ways of being and their rela-
tions with other possible ways of being represents an engagement with the Forms that is not 
reducible to propositional assent.
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find themselves.”9 How does conceptual understanding connect with this 
practical task? Does not my initial definition of wisdom appear to be too 
theoretical to fulfill the role Nozick says wisdom must satisfy?
To deal with this problem, I must expand on what I mean by conceptu-
al understanding. I have already said that the understanding in question 
is a kind of seeing, a direct awareness of something. To use the Heideg-
gerian metaphor, the concept is what uncovers or reveals some aspect 
of reality. What must be added at this point is that the seeing must be 
thought of as including an “appreciating” or “proper estimating” of what 
is seen. The person who genuinely understands gratitude is the person 
who not only sees what gratitude essentially is but also grasps the value 
and importance of gratitude. If our minds are steeped in the Humean 
fact-value distinction, this claim may seem puzzling, but that may say 
more about this Humean picture of reality than about how things are. 
After all, Plato himself thought that the person who had a knowledge of 
the Forms would also be the person who knew how to live well, and even 
would know how to direct a society. Plato’s theory of Forms, even if not it-
self Socratic, grows out of the Socratic quest to understand such things as 
courage, friendship, and justice. To make sense of the value Plato attaches 
to the Forms, we must not think of the seeing involved in understanding 
as simply a knowledge of propositional facts, but as an awareness of the 
true nature of something that includes a proper appreciation of its value. 
The person who can say what beauty is, and even what things may possi-
bly be beautiful, but who does not see that what is beautiful is something 
to be savored and enjoyed does not really understand beauty, just as the 
person who can say what our moral obligations are, but fails to see that an 
obligation is something that must be fulfilled does not really understand 
the nature of moral obligation.
Once we see that conceptual understanding has this valuational dimen-
sion, we can also deal with a second possible objection. One might think 
that wisdom could not simply consist in conceptual understanding per 
se, but rather understanding of what is really important. After all, no one, 
with the possible exception of Kermit the Frog, thinks that a deep under-
standing of “greenness” is a crucial element in wisdom. Surely, the wise 
human person is mainly concerned with understanding those concepts 
that bear in a crucial way on human existence.
The objection seems to be on target; not all concepts are equally impor-
tant from the perspective of the wise person. However, if understanding 
contains the valuational dimension I have suggested it does, we can see 
why this is so. To understand a concept deeply is also to grasp the relative 
importance of what that concept discloses. The wise human is not so con-
cerned about understanding the concept of greenness precisely because 
this person perceives that greenness is, in the great scheme of things, not 
9Robert Nozick, The Examined Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), p. 267. Italics 
original.
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centrally important to human life. If a person is red-green color blind, 
as I in fact am, this may impair his life to some degree, but it will not 
prevent such a person from living a rich and significant life. To be mor-
ally blind, on the other hand, to fail to grasp the nature of justice and to 
see its importance in human life, would be a significant barrier to a rich 
and flourishing human existence. Justice is simply far more important 
than greenness.
Implicit in this reply is an important distinction I need to make: the dis-
tinction between divine wisdom and human wisdom. Such a distinction is 
crucial for any form of Platonism that wants to be Christian, and perhaps 
it is crucial for any form at all. It is worth recalling that Socrates himself, 
at his trial, is credited by Plato with the claim that “real wisdom is the 
property of God.” If we think of the Forms, as Christian Platonists have 
traditionally done, as Ideas in the Divine Mind, then we can see why true 
wisdom must be identified with God’s wisdom. God himself, with perfect 
self-knowledge of the Forms which exist in the Divine Mind, understands 
all possibilities, including in this understanding an appreciation of their 
relationships to each other and their relative value. God understands all 
concepts, and also understands and properly appreciates all of them in 
their relative significance. Human wisdom will be an understanding of 
those concepts, possible ways of being, that bear significantly on human 
existence, and will especially be an understanding of those Forms that are 
most important for human life.10
Both divine and human wisdom, on the account I am sketching, are 
importantly linked to love. No less an authority than Thomas Aquinas 
maintains that God’s wisdom is identical to his love,11 and I think we can 
see why this must be so.12 To love something or someone is to appreciate 
the value of what is loved, and to will the flourishing of that something 
or someone, will that it fully realize the good of which it is capable. God’s 
wisdom, as I am conceiving it, includes an appreciation of the value of 
every possibility. This gives God a reason to create a good world, and 
it also means that God will relish those possibilities he has chosen to 
10The recent development of “virtue epistemology” seems likely to be one that will di-
rect increased attention to wisdom, since wisdom is traditionally seen as one of the central 
virtues. See, for example, the discussion of practical wisdom in Robert C. Roberts and W. 
Jay Wood, Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), pp. 305–324. Other virtue epistemologists, such as Linda Zagzebski, also argue 
that virtue epistemology does a better job of focusing proper attention on wisdom, and she 
sees wisdom as linked to understanding. See her Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature 
of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), pp. 43–50.
11For a clear discussion of Aquinas’s view of wisdom, see Thomas Hibbs, “Wisdom Trans-
formed by Love,” in Where Wisdom is Found: Christian Reflections (Baylor Center for Christian 
Ethics, No. 30, 2009), pp. 38–45.
12In referring to Aquinas, I don’t mean of course to claim that Aquinas would fully en-
dorse the Platonist account I am giving in this paper. Although Aquinas’s account of wisdom 
has Platonist elements derived from Augustine, Aristotle is the most significant influence. 
For an account of Aquinas on wisdom (focusing mainly on wisdom as a human virtue), see 
Eleonore Stump, Aquinas (London; New York: Routledge, 2003), pp. 339–360.
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actualize. God’s creation is itself a manifestation of God’s wisdom, and we 
can understanding why St. Paul should affirm that the “divine nature,” 
presumably including the divine wisdom, can be “clearly seen” from the 
things that God has made.13 It is thus equally true to see creation as a 
manifestation of divine love and divine wisdom, for the two qualities in 
God are not distinct.
Human wisdom shows a similar linkage. Wise human persons have 
a special concern for those concepts that bear centrally on human life, 
and their understanding of these possibilities, like God’s understanding, 
is a kind of seeing that includes appreciating and savoring the value of 
what is seen. The wise person not only understands but loves the good 
in each thing, and specially loves those goods that are essential for hu-
man flourishing. Such a “seeing” is not merely theoretical in character. 
Rather, to understand and appreciate the possible ways of being just, 
and merciful, and kind, and the relation between such concepts, is to 
have a kind of insight into how to live, as well as to have the motivation 
for living rightly. Human wisdom in this sense will include an under-
standing not just of these concepts as general human possibilities, but of 
the particular forms these possibilities may take in relation to a person’s 
own particular situation.
The preceding is of course only a very rough and preliminary sketch. 
Let me now try to develop it just a bit by attempting to spell out some of 
the implications of the view I am proposing. It has, I believe, many of the 
features one would want in any account of wisdom, and has particular 
features that commend it to Christians who want an account of wisdom 
that is faithful to the Biblical revelation.
1. The view proposed incorporates the Biblical view that in some way 
God is not only wise but is Wisdom itself (e.g., I Corinthians 1:24, “Christ 
the wisdom of God”), since ontologically God is perfect understanding of 
the Forms and the Forms that are known are part of the Divine Being.
2. Since God himself is both Wisdom and supremely wise, we can un-
derstand why it can be true that God is the source of human wisdom, so 
that James writes that if anyone lacks wisdom, he should ask God, and it 
will be given to him (James 1:5).
3. We can also understand why the Christian community has always 
taught that the Biblical revelation itself is a source of human wisdom. If 
the Scriptures are a true revelation from God, we would expect that rev-
elation to reflect and reveal God’s character; if God is wisdom, then his 
revelation will be a source of wisdom. This point should remind us that 
we should seek from the Bible not merely propositional knowledge but 
also understanding in the special sense I have given it in this essay, espe-
cially understanding that is directed to those concepts that are central to 
human life.
13Romans 1:20.
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4. We can also understand why wisdom, though not identical to propo-
sitional knowledge, is linked to this kind of knowledge. Since God’s wis-
dom is manifest in his creation, it is logical that knowledge of that creation 
should foster wisdom, or least make wisdom possible. It is also reasonable 
to think that a wise person will understand propositional knowledge itself 
as a possibility and properly appreciate and value knowledge.
5. One important feature of wisdom as I have described it is that, in con-
trast to propositional knowledge, it is something that comes in degrees. As 
I have already noted, conceptual understanding can be superficial or deep, 
and it is possible for an individual to gain more and more understanding 
of the possibilities embodied in a concept and the relations between that 
concept and others. This seems like the right result, since wisdom is the 
kind of thing that one can acquire in degrees.
6. On the view I have sketched, we can understand why human wisdom 
can be something that relatively uneducated and simple people may pos-
sess. Such people may lack an understanding of many concepts; they might, 
for example, not grasp the notion of “supervenience,” nor understand what 
a quark is. However, they might have a deep understanding of the concepts 
that bear most centrally on human life, including such concepts as friend-
ship, love, honesty, courage, truth, and fidelity. Perhaps, most vitally, they 
understand what it is to be a human being because they understand God. 
The Scriptures say that “the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom” 
(Psalm 111:10). Perhaps this means that it is crucial to understand human 
life in relation to God and God’s purposes in order to be wise.
One might object that what we have in this case must include proposi-
tional knowledge, since the person must know such propositions as “God 
exists” and “God has created all things, including human beings.” I think 
that this is right, and thus a wise person will have some propositional 
knowledge. So let me revise my initial account of wisdom as conceptual 
understanding, and say that wisdom is conceptual understanding plus 
that propositional knowledge that is essential to a deep understanding 
of oneself, one’s world, and God. However, I am inclined to say that the 
propositional knowledge is not the basis of the wisdom, but that the prop-
ositional knowledge that is an ingredient in wisdom flows out of the kind 
of “seeing” I described earlier. The person who really understands God 
will certainly know that God exists, but the person knows that because he 
or she is simply aware of God’s reality.
Maybe this is in fact the true basis of Anselm’s ontological argument: 
the person who really understands God has a kind of awareness of God’s 
reality that makes it possible to know that God exists. In any case it is 
certainly true that a person who understands those concepts central to 
human existence, and thus knows how to live well, is wise, even if such a 
person does not have a great stock of propositional knowledge.
7. The claim that “the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom” can 
profitably be pushed a bit further. One might think that fear is a negative 
WISDOM AS CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDING 379
and unworthy emotion, one that would play little role in the character of 
a wise person. However, I think that the Biblical view here is right. One 
might say that the wise person is not a person who lacks fear, but who has 
learned to fear the right things. To “fear the Lord” is to fear displeasing 
God, to fear breaking my relationship with God and making it impossible 
for me to become a friend of God. The wise person has a proper fear for 
this kind of thing, and perhaps less fear of the things that typically domi-
nate a person’s outlook. We humans fear all kinds of things: we fear losing 
our jobs, we fear becoming ill. Students fear that they will fail a test or do 
poorly on an assignment. Such fears are human and they are often reason-
able. But a person who has the fear of the Lord will not allow such fears to 
become excessive. She knows that God will not desert her even if she loses 
her job. She knows her life will still be meaningful even if she becomes ill. 
She knows that even death will not separate her from the love of God in 
Christ, for she has a deep understanding of that love.
8. The last point can be linked to a point about emotions. Robert Rob-
erts has argued convincingly that one of the characteristics of a wise per-
son is that such a person responds emotionally in the right ways to the 
right things. If wisdom is a kind of understanding that involves a direct 
awareness of some possibility, and if that awareness includes a proper 
estimation of the value of that possibility, then we can see why this should 
be so. On Roberts’s account of an emotion, an emotion is itself a kind of 
perception or seeing, and if it springs from virtuous dispositions of caring 
and thinking, it will include a proper appreciation of the value or disvalue 
of what one perceives.14 We can thus understand both why it is that wise 
people manifest their wisdom partly through their emotional responses, 
and also why it is that the development of proper emotions is part of what 
is required to become humanly wise. This means that part of the knowl-
edge that is essential to wisdom can be acquired through emotions; to use 
the language of the medievals, it is a “connatural knowledge.”
9. How does a person become wiser? How is wisdom acquired? If 
wisdom is conceptual understanding of the kind I have described, this 
question reduces to the question as to how one gains a genuine grasp of 
concepts. Perhaps Wittgenstein can be of help here. We gain an under-
standing of a concept by learning to play the language game in which 
that concept is embedded. And we learn to do that by participating in a 
“form of life,” since “to imagine a language is to imagine a form of life.”15 
Wisdom is gained through living, particularly living in association with 
others who are wise.
If this is correct, then we can understand why the acquisition of wis-
dom is linked to experience, and why so many cultures (with the possible 
14See Robert Roberts, “Emotions in the Epistemology of Paul the Apostle,” in Claremont 
Studies in the Philosophy of Religion, ed. I. U. Dalferth (Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming). For 
Roberts’s account of emotions, see his Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
15Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 3rd ed., trans. G. E. M. Anscombe 
(New York: The MacMillan Col, 1958), #19, 8e.
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exception of our own, which glorifies youth) have viewed older people with 
respect, as people more likely to be wise. Though wisdom does not come 
merely through years and the accumulation of experiences, those who have 
years of life experience have had more opportunities to acquire wisdom.
From a Christian perspective, the Church may be seen as a commu-
nity that inculcates wisdom. The Church is founded on the examples and 
teachings of Old Testament saints and prophets, New Testament apostles, 
and pre-eminently Jesus himself. Christianity sees wisdom as something 
that participation in this communal form of life can foster and encourage, 
since it is a community founded by God himself, who is both Wisdom 
and supremely wise. The Church as a community helps its members ac-
quire a proper understanding of God, themselves, and the world in which 
they live—helping them acquire a proper appreciation and love for what 
is valuable and a proper fear for what is dangerous.
10. In conclusion I want to say something about what I would call the 
perspectival character of Christian wisdom, or what might properly be 
called its polemical character. If one asks what the differences are between 
Platonism per se and Christian Platonism, a crucial part of the answer lies 
in the Christian teaching that humans are sinful. Plato, so far as I can see, 
has nothing comparable to this Christian doctrine. To be sure, the incar-
nation of the immortal soul into a body is a kind of fall for Plato, and this 
fall seems to entail that the struggle for truth will be a difficult one. But 
this seems quite different from the Christian teaching that humans are 
sinful, with sinfulness being understood as a kind of spiritual rebellion 
on our parts. I take it that the Christian doctrine of sin has implications 
for our lives as knowers and that it implies something about our attitude 
towards wisdom.
If we are sinful creatures, this implies that there is an ambivalence in 
our stance towards truth and our stance towards wisdom. To be sure, wis-
dom and truth may be what we desire and what we are seeking in some 
sense, but they also may be what we fear and what we are fleeing. The ac-
quisition of true wisdom may then be painful, and require a fundamental 
transformation in our character. Those who have not been so transformed, 
and perhaps this is all of us to some degree or other, may therefore find 
that genuine wisdom is not what we expected it to be. Perhaps we will in 
fact think it is foolishness.
This at least seems to me to be what Paul is saying in I Corinthians 1, 
from verse 18 through 30. The Christian message is, says Paul, “foolish-
ness to those who are perishing.” Paul asks rhetorically, “Where is the 
wise man? Where is the scholar?” implying that genuine wisdom cannot 
be found simply through the intellectual efforts of untransformed, sinful 
humans. Paul implies that a simple, uneducated follower of Jesus may be 
wiser than a revered scholar, if that revered scholar has not been trans-
formed by the love of God. Though in reality Christ is himself true wis-
dom, the wisdom of God, this wisdom appears to be foolishness to what 
may be called “worldly wisdom.”
WISDOM AS CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDING 381
And so it does. Worldly wisdom says that it is smart to seek riches and 
power; it says that a wise person seeks to get the attention and favor of 
those with money and power. Those who follow Christ’s way and Christ’s 
teaching must be willing to love the unlovable, to love one’s enemies, and 
to be willing to give up any earthly riches or position for the sake of God 
and God’s kingdom. From the point of view of God, this worldly wisdom, 
which might better be called worldly shrewdness, is anything but wise. It 
reflects a shallow understanding of the value of many things. The worldly 
wise person values things highly that are not very valuable; fears things 
greatly that are not so fearful. Becoming truly wise then is not merely 
acquiring true understanding; it is also unlearning false understanding, 
freeing oneself from the grip of a false conceptual picture.
This polemical side of wisdom is both true and important. Neverthe-
less, I think we should not see the contrast Paul draws between God’s wis-
dom and human wisdom as a necessary one, but as a descriptive comment 
of what will generally be the case. After all, in Plato’s Apology Socrates 
seems to capture some themes that are part of Biblical wisdom, affirming 
that it is much worse to do evil than to suffer at the hands of evil-doers, 
and that ultimately nothing can harm a truly good person, for God does 
not allow this.
In The Last Battle, the concluding volume in C. S. Lewis’s Narnia series, 
all of the characters from earlier books find each other in the “true Nar-
nia,” the place which is their true home. They come to understand that 
they loved the old Narnia just because of its resemblance to the real Nar-
nia. The old Professor from the first volume, as he recognizes the true 
Forms of all the things he loved in Narnia, sums up the message: “Plato 
was right all along.” Perhaps the Professor was right and Christians can 
find wisdom in a Platonic account of wisdom.
Baylor University
